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IN his 1903 classic The Souls of
Black Folk, W.E.B. Du Bois made a prognosis that has haunted the twentieth century: "Herein lie buried many things which if read in patience may show the strange meaning of being black here at the dawning of the Twentieth Century. This meaning is not without interest to you, Gentle Reader; for the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line" (1903, 41) . When Du Bois wrote "Gentle Reader," he was being more than rhetorical, for this "Reader," for whom there was once presumed a lack of interest and, therefore, (falsely) a lack of relevance, is here alerted that his or her condition, being other than black, was inscribed in the core of the problems in question.
The black, whose "strange meaning" and "being" were also called into question as "the Negro problem," represented also a tension in the presumed order. Du Bois did not here write about being black but about its meaning. He announced a hermeneutical turn that would delight even his most zealous philosophical successors. This hermeneutical turn signaled a moment in a complex struggle, a moment marked by its admission of incompleteness and probably impossible closure. The black, subject to interpretation, became a designation that could be held by different groups at different times and as such was both concrete and metaphorical. If the color line is at the mercy of interpretive blackness, then its boundaries carry risks, always, of changing and overlapping. The Gentle Reader's possibilities are announced, then, as paradoxically less fixed in their fixedness than he or she may be willing to admit. Such a Reader may intensify, then, his or her effort to take "precautions." Du Bois's announcement has played itself out, prophetically, in this regard: race/color has marked a course through the twentieth century like a rift through the planet, while its heaps of ideological rubbish have piled themselves up, in their characteristic divides, like casualties on the Western front. Deny it as we may, as a consequence or cause of a multitude of evils, the problem of the color line is a persisting problem, a problem that, in the eyes of some, is here to stay (for example, Bell 1992). Born from the divide of black and white, it serves as a blueprint of the ongoing division of humankind. The color line is also a metaphor that exceeds its own concrete formulation. It is the race line as well as the gender line, the class line, the sexual-orientation line, the religious line-in short, the line between "normal" and "abnormal" identity.
The twentieth century was also marked by another pronouncement of grave import: the struggle for liberation and, hence, revolution. There were revolutionary struggles in Asia, decolonization struggles in Africa and the Caribbean, civil rights struggles in the United States, and indigenous struggles worldwide. Like the fate of Du Bois's announcement on color, many of the revolutionary efforts at the century's morn have fallen into ill repute at its twilight. But the forces that gave them validity haunt our present. Global economic inequality intensifies in the In the liberatory question, we head, too, through a series of philosophical turns. Although the two meet on the question of who is to be liberated, the liberating animus charts a course of value that at times transcends being, although not always essence. Liberation is a teleological concern, a concern about purpose, a concern about ought and whys: Whatever we may be, the point is to focus energy on what we ought to become. ofAmerica], the University could hardly offer me a fellowship. A compromise was hit on and I was nominated to the unusual status of "assistant" instructor. Even at that there must have been some opposition, for the invitation was not particularly cordial. I was offered a salary of $900 for a period limited to one year. I was given no real academic stand-ing, no official recognition of any kind; my name was eventually omitted from the catalogue; I had no contact with students, and very little with members ofthe faculty, even in my own department. The Negro problem was in my mind a matter of systematic investigation and intelligent understanding. The world was thinking wrong about race, because it did not know. The ultimate evil was stupidity. The cure for it was knowledge based on scientific investigation. At the University of Pennsylvania I ignored the pitiful stipend. It made no difference to me that I was put down as an "assistant instructor," and even at that, that my name never actually got into the catalogue; it goes without saying that I did no instructing save once to pilot a pack of idiots through the Negro slums. (197) Du Bois faced a formidable task. That he was given only a year, without assistance, to present a systematic study of the black population in the Seventh Ward of Philadelphia betrayed the bad faith of the institutions that commissioned that study. In effect, Du Bois was set up to fail but with the provision that his failure count as the best possible effort to study that community and, thus, serve as affirmation of the pathologies of the community under study. In other words, Du Bois's study was to serve as a form of theodicean legitimation of Philadelphian society (and by implication, U.S. society). Theodicy is the effort to reconcile the goodness of an all-powerful deity with the existence of evil. In modern times, theodicy has been secularized through making political systems or systems of rationalization stand for the fallen god and by making social evils or contradictions stand for the annoying evils or imperfections of the system. Du Bois's labors were expected to demonstrate that Philadelphia's evils were extrasystemic, were features of the black populations, rather than intrasystemic, things endemic to the system and, hence, things done to the black populations.
Nevertheless
We see here an ironic relation to research, for if Du Bois were successful at what he was commissioned to do, he would have been a failure at what he had set out to do, which was to find out the "truth," as it were, of the Philadelphia black population's situation. The glitch in the institution's expectations was Du Bois himself. He was, after all, W.E.B. Du Bois, the future dean of African American scholarship. That title eventually came to him from the pioneering work he produced from The Philadelphia Negro (1899) through to Black Reconstruction in America ([1935] 1992) and other subsequent work in history, sociology, political economy, and philosophy. The 28-year-old Du Bois knew that he was hired as a lackey to legitimize policies premised upon black pathology, but, being a "race man," he knew, as well, that opportunities for black folk to succeed instead of to fail were few and far between. He knew that any effort on his part to study and demonstrate the ordinary required extraordinary efforts, efforts that were no less than Promethean. Reflecting on the opposition he faced, he later wrote:
Of the theory back of the plan of this study of Negroes I neither knew nor cared. I saw only here a chance to study an historical group of black folks and to show exactly what their place was in the community. ... Whites said: Why study the obvious? Blacks said: Are we animals to be dissected and by an unknown Negro at that? Yet, I made a study of the Philadelphia Negro so thorough that it has withstood the criticism of 60 years. (1968, 197) Indeed, he had. Du Bois's work withstood 60 years of criticism because he not only studied the black populations in Philadelphia but also questioned the study of black folk in the United States and, by implication, other anti-black societies. The paper he presented to the American Academy of Political and Social Science, "The Study of the Negro Problems" (1898b), inaugurated a profound turn in the study of human beings in the modern era. The title brought the turn into focus succinctly by its focus on study. Du Bois, in effect, announced the metatheoretical question of how theory is formulated. There is something peculiar, he suggests at the outset, about how blacks are studied-key to consider is whether they are studied at allwhich requires reflection on one's method more than one would with populations who are normative. Practices of systematic inquiry and critical self-assessments are often put to the wayside by commentators in favor of opinionated statements of what, supposedly, must be so with regard to blacks. In effect, the Negro problems were thrown out of the sphere of human problems into the sphere of necessity premised upon pathologies. Consequently, the Negro problems often collapsed into the Negro Problem-the problem, in other words, of having Negroes around. In this regard, it was, as commentators (for example, Fanon 1967) subsequently noted, a predominantly white problem.
FROM PROBLEMATIC PEOPLE TO PEOPLE'S PROBLEMS
The problem ofproblematized people is well known among existential and phenomenological theorists (see Freire 1990; Gordon 1995a Gordon , 1995b Gordon , 1997a Gordon , 1997b . It can be understood in terms of the spirit of seriousness. The spirit of seriousness emerges when there is a collapse in the divide between values and the material world (compare with Gordon 1995a, chap. 6). In such instances, the material world becomes a cause of values and vice versa. In other words, there is such an isomorphic relation between values and objects of value that they become one. Thus, the object fails any longer to signify or suggest a particular value or meaning. It becomes that value or meaning. In cases of a problematic people, the result is straightforward: they cease to be people who might face, signify, or be associated with a set of problems. They become those problems. Thus, a problematic people do not signify crime, licentiousness, and other social pathologies; they, under such a view, are crime, licentiousness, and other social pathologies (see, for example, Fanon 1967, chap. 6).
How does one study problems faced by a people without collapsing them into the problems themselves? Du Bois begins by offering a definition of social problems: "A social problem is the failure of an organized social group to realize its group ideals, through the inability to adapt a certain desired line of action to given conditions of life" (1898b, 2). That Du Bois focuses on the social is already a theoretical advance. For in his time, the tendency was to approach the study of a people in terms of either phylogenic or ontogenic considerations. The phylogenic focuses on species' differences where, especially with regard to the "racial" status of blacks, debate took the form of whether they were members of the human species. The ontogenic consideration had limitations in its focus on the individual organism. With such a focus, one would address simply an individual organism that works and another that fails-as are easily found in any study of a set of human subjects-but the meaning of working and failing transcends the organism itself. The problems, matters relating to success or failure, require a third mediating consideration: the social world (compare with Fanon 1967, intro.). The social world mediates the phylogenic and the ontogenic and presents, through the complexity of social life-life premised upon intentions, actions, and the ongoing achievement of intersubjective relations-a world of agency, deliberation, and contingency. It is a world without accident yet without, as well, necessity. It is a world that brings things into being that need not have been brought forth. By focusing on the social, then, Du Bois has, in one sweep, taken the U.S. discourse on blackness onto unfamiliar ground.
The unfamiliar ground of social analysis requires a different way of reading problems:
Thus a social problem is ever a relation between conditions and action, and as conditions and actions vary and change from group to group from time to time and from place to place, so social problems change, develop and grow. Consequently, though we ordinarily speak of the Negro problem as though it were one unchanged question, students must recognize the obvious fact that this problem, like others, has had a long historical development, has changed with the growth and evolution of the nation; moreover, that it is not one problem, but rather a plexus of social problems, some new, some old, some simple, some complex; and these problems have their one bond of unity in the act that they group themselves about those Africans whom two centuries of slave-trading brought into the land. (1898b, 3) That social problems are not static raises the question whether it is possible to conduct systematic study of a constantly changing or metastable subject. The metastability of the subject here is a function of human reality. The human being is a subject that constantly challenges the permanent relevance of data. In effect, the tendency to stratify the Negro problem betrays a tendency to address black populations as though they were not human populations. As human populations, they are metastable. Such a reminder brings into focus an important dimension of the problem of studying black folk. For if an error in studying black folk emerges from a failure to recognize their humanity, one might think that such an error could easily be alleviated by simply studying them as human beings. The question brings into focus the problem with racial analysis. Can a racial formation be rigorously studied as a human formation? Du Bois addresses this problem by raising another dimension of the human being that is not addressed simply by recognizing its capacity for change. After raising the social, he explores the historical specificity of blacks in the United States. The historical reality of blacks in America is one of struggling against conquest, kidnapping, enslavement, and a constant reconstruction of racial hierarchies at each moment of seeming triumph over racial oppression. The Civil War, he points out, eradicated legalized chattel slavery without eliminating the conditions that racialized slavery in the first place. The result was, then, a reassertion of forces against the freedom of black folk. This dialectic between freedom and unfreedom is such that it raises, as well, the question of a dialectic between the past and the future. In taking heed of historical impositions and the possibilities sought in present inquiry, Du Bois brings another problem into focus-the problem of the political: "They do not share the full national life because there has always existed in America a convic- inward, abstract choices, like "neither," or "I will choose X or Y affirmatively or reluctantly," and so on. Eventually, it becomes clear that to make more than two choices without collapsing onto myself and the way I make choices, I will need to expand my options. But to do so would put me in conflict with a world that has only given me two options. In effect, then, to live like everyone else places me in a situation of conflict. Here, we see the problem brought into philosophical focus. For, to live like everyone else, to live as "ordinary," as "normal," would require of me an "extraordinary" act-to change the system, which may require powers beyond my capacity, or to change myself, which, although a localized exercise of power, would require something of me that is not demanded of others. In either formulation, I would have to work harder than others.
That is what Du Bois means to point out in his list of hardships faced by social limitation (see, for example, Du Bois 1898b, 8). The problem is particularly stark if we consider Jim Crow. In limiting the options available for blacks in the everyday negotiation of social life, Jim Crow increased the probability of black social life being in conflict with American social life; it increased the probability of blacks breaking the law on an everyday basis. Such limited options forced every black to face choices about the self that placed selfhood in conflict with humanhood.
In the post-Jim Crow era, problems continue as the collapse of blacks into pathologies is such that it limits the options available for blacks in civil society. Many blacks, for instance, in going about their everyday life, incur a constant risk of incarceration. Under such circumstances, blacks take extraordinary measures to live an ordinary life; an ordinary life, after all, should not involve expected encounters with the criminal justice system.
The study of the Negro problem then calls for a provocative form of human study-the study of a human population whose humanity is a structurally denied feature of the society in which they are studied. Implicit in Du Bois's call for such a study, then, is an indictment of the society itself: "The sole aim of any society is to settle its problems in accordance with its highest ideals, and the only rational method of accomplishing this is to study those problems in the light of the best scientific research" (Du Bois 1898b, 10) .
And what is the best scientific research? The best scientific research has criteria that will, at best, put into relief some (if not all) of the prejudices of the researchers. Du Bois adds to his appeal the claim that "the American Negro deserves study for the great end of advancing the Epistemological openness pertains to the anonymity that undergirds the social dimension of each social group. A social group is such that each member can occupy the role that exemplifies it. When the theorist encounters a member of that group and identifies, usually by virtue of the role the member performs, the social group to which he or she belongs, it is good practice to restrict judgments to the context and to the social role but not over the full biography of the individual who plays that role. Those aspects remain anonymous, nameless. Thus, to pass by a student and to recognize him or her as a student need not entail the role "student" to cover the entire scope of that student's life and being. Such is the case with many other social roles and groups. There is always more that one could learn about the individual who occupies that social role.
In the case of epistemic closure, however, the identification of the social role is all one needs for a plethora of other judgments. In effect, to know that role is to know all there is to know about the individual. In effect, there is no distinction between him or her and the social role, which makes the individual an essential representative of the entire group. The group, then, becomes pure exterior being. Its members are without "insides" or hidden spaces for interrogation. One thus counts for all. The guiding principle of avoiding the fallacy of hasty generalizations is violated here as a matter of course. Du Bois's counsel, then, is toward opening this space of inquiry.
Our turn to anonymity brings us to sociological interpretation. To break out of epistemic closure, one needs to recognize that blacks have points of view on the world. Such an approach "should aim to study those finer manifestations of social life which history can but mention and which statistics can not count, such as the expression of Negro life as found in their hundred newspapers, their considerable literature, their music and folklore and their germ of esthetic life-in fine, in all the movements and customs among them that manifest the existence of a distinct social mind" (Du Bois 1898b, 20) .
The second category, the peculiar social environment, addresses the problem of options raised before. Du Bois ends the essay by issuing a call that has lost its power today in light of recent efforts to discard the study of race: "True lovers of humanity can only hold higher the pure ideals of science, and continue to insist that if we would solve a problem we must study it" (Du Bois 1898b, 23) . The transition from Negro to Black to Afro-American to African American has been marked, as well, by the transition from race to contemporary claims of its scientific invalidity and its so-called social and political irrelevance (for example, Appiah 1992). In response, critics have issued the same objection as Du Bois did a century ago: deny as we might the continued relevance of race and racism in the lives of large segments of the American population, how will those who continue to bear the brunt of discrimination present their case without data that identify them as targets of the discrimination?
EPISTEMIC LIMITATIONS OF RACE REPRESENTATION
The problem with data is that they must be rigorously gathered. Rigor here means that the process of gathering and interpreting data must be guided by an understanding of the challenges raised by human studies and an understanding of the logic of social action and claims of universality. Moreover, the challenge addresses the integrity of the theorist as well, especially the theorist who might be a member of the community under discussion. As Du Bois observed later in his Soliloquy: I became painfully aware that merely being born in a group, does not necessarily make one possessed of complete knowledge concerning it. I had learned far more from Philadelphia Negroes than I had taught them concerning the Negro Problem. (Du Bois 1968, 198) A member of a group does not live his or her everyday experience in a way that constitutes the reflection of study. To study one's lived reality requires a displacement and a new set of questions about that reality that render one's experiences, at best, data to be added to the stream of data to be interpreted. But more, the theoretical questions raised may be such that there is no precedent for them, which means that by raising them, one has placed oneself outside of a privileged sphere of knowledge. How one lives in a community is not identical with the sort of knowledge involved in how one studies a community.
A striking feature of Du Bois's recommendations for rigorous study, however, is that in the midst of all his almost positivistic conceptions of objectivity in the study of black folk, there are also the hermeneutical considerations and the experiential considerations of looking at blacks from the inside. These are concerns that Du Bois himself deploys in another essay from the period, "On the Conservation of the Races" (1898a), a paper that he presented to the Negro Academy the same year in which he By raising the question of black problems from blacks' point of view, Du Bois raised the question of an "inside" that required an approach to social phenomena that puts the theorist in a position to break down the gap between himself or herself and the subjects of study. For in principle if the theorist can imagine the black point of view as a point of view that can be communicated, then already a gap between the theorist and the black subject of study has been bridged. The theorist, whether white or of color, must work with the view of communicability and, simultaneously, a process of interrogation that will bring forth what black subjects are willing to divulge. In short, the method presupposes agency, freedom, and responsibility, which transforms the epistemological expectations of inquiry. From the "outside," one could receive limited data. From the "inside," one could, as well, receive limited data. Combined, one receives "good" data, "solid" data, "rigorously acquired" data, but never "complete" data. It is by staying attuned to the incompleteness of all data with regard to human beings that one makes the approach humanistic. It is a method that reveals that, when it comes to the human being, there will always be more to learn and, hence, more to research. SOME CONCLUSIONS Our times are marked by a profound divide in approaches to human study. The sentiments, as we have seen, gear toward total abandonment of liberatory questions in favor of identity questions. Without the liberatory calling, identity questions become struggles over definition or the rejection of definitions, ironically, on supposedly purely theoretical grounds. The result has been, on one hand, the continued, often reactionary influence of neopositivistic approaches, where the effort is to imitate the natural sciences through quantitative conceptions of objectivity. At the other extreme is the postmodern rejection of all "totalizations" and concepts like "progress" and "rigor" and even the adjective
